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RECENT CASES
The rules in question were old when the Great Charter was still in
its infancy; but the necessity of certainty and precision in determining
the quality of interests in property, has preserved them intact to the
present day.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE-LIMITATION ON POWER OF STATES
TO REGULATE
With the power of the federal government to regulate agriculture,
labor, industry and business under the commerce clause1 greatly ex-
panded as the result of recent decisions, z attention has been focused
upon the corresponding problem of the extent to which the grant of
power to the federal government to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce constitutes a limitation upon the power of the states.3 A
recent decision in the case of Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. People of State
of Michigan 4 may serve to redefine the extent of that limitation.
The excursion company operated an amusement park upon an island
in Canadian waters fifteen miles from Detroit, and steamships by
which persons were brought to and from Detroit. No passengers were
accommodated overnight on the island or for passage to points beyond.
Officers ejected a colored girl who came aboard with a party, other-
wise composed of white girls. The excursion company was for this
reason convicted of a misdemeanor under a state statutes which forbade
denial of equal accommodations on public conveyance to any persons
because of color. Appealing from a decision of the State Supreme
Court affirming the conviction, the carrier contended that the state
statute transgressed the limitations of the commerce clause, relying
on two earlier decisions, one6 of which held a state statute requiring
equality of accommodation for colored passengers inapplicable to a packet
plying in interstate commerce, and the other" of which held a state
I U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
2 See, e.g., Wickard Fiburn, 317 U. S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed.
122 (1943); United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct.
451, 85 I Ed. 609 (1941); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters'
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
3 See Dowling "Interstate Commerce and State Power Revised Ver-
sion" 47 Columbia L. Rev. 546 (1947).
4 68 S. Ct. 358 (U.S. 1948).
5 Michigan Civil Rights Act, Penal Code It 146-8, as amended Public
Act 117, 1937; Mich. Stats. Ann. (1946) Cum. Supp. If 28.343-6. The
text of the Act is given in a marginal note to the principal case.
6 Hall v. de Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878).
7 Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 66 S. Ct, 1050,
90 L. Ed. 1317, 165 A.L.R. 574 (1946).
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statute requiring segregation of colored passengers to be inapplicable to a
bus operated in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court affirmed, hold-
ing that there was no inconsistency, present or threatened, between the
state policy enforced through this statute and any federal or Canadian
interest; and that the commerce, although admittedly foreign, was of
such a peculiarly local character to permit state regulation.
There is little or no problem when Congress has taken action to
regulate any particular activity in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce. In such cases, the federal statute supersedes all inconsistent
state laws.8 Where the court has held.the federal power to be a
limitation upon state power, Congress may cede power to regulate to
the states.9 This does not violate the rule that federal legislative power
may not be delegated to the states; because the power is not exclusively
federal. 10 The problem arises only when, as in the principal case, there
is no conflict with a superior federal statute, and an individual engaged
in commerce seeks to avoid state regulation on the ground that state
power to act is limited by.the general terms of the federal organic law.
The cases heretofore decided have attempted to define the limitation
upon state power in terms of the requirements of the federal grant.
Since the grant of power to the federal government is not expressly
declared to be exclusive, it was held by the Supreme Court, in the first
test,"1 that federal power should be construed as exclusive to, and only
8 See e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. People of the State of New York, 233
U. S. 671, 34 S. Ct. 756, 58 L. Ed. 1149, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 266 (1914).
9 In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 S. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572 (1891),
federal statute permitting states to prohibit sale of liquor shipped in
interstate commerce; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S.
408, 66 S. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1023 (1946), sustaining state taxes on the
insurance business consequent upon a federal statute providing that the
Insurance business shall continue to be subject to state laws; Robertson
v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 66 S. Ct. 1160, 90 L. Ed. 1040 (1946),
sustaining state regulation of insurance business.
10 Compare Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 S. Ct.
438, 64 L, Ed. 834, 11 A.L.R. 1145 (1920), holding that the power of
Congress to prescribe rules of maritime law is exclusive and cannot
be delegated to the states, with Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How.
299, 18 L. Ed. 996 (1851), holding that a state law regulating licensing
of harbor pilots, to constitute a permissible regulation of interstate and
foreign commerce, where, by an early act of Congress, it was provided
that pilotage should continue to be regulated by the several states. The
court (Curtis, J.) said: "If the Constitution excluded the states from
making any law regulating commerce, certainly Congress cannot regrant,
or In any manner reconvey to the states, that power."
11 Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed.
996 (1851). See note 10, snpra. "Either absolutely to affirm, or deny
that the nature of this power requires exclusive legislation by Congress,
is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert
concerning all of them what is really applicable but to a part. What-
[Val. 2
1948] RECENT CASES 247
to, the extent of necessity. Thus, if the subject of regulation impera-
tively demands a uniform rule, Congress has exclusive power and state
power is limited.' 2 On the other hand, if the matter to be regulated
requires local and diversified treatment and can never effectively be
controlled by a uniform national rule, the federal constitution does
not prohibit state action. 13 The court came to assume the role of
arbiter, determining in doubtful cases whether the problem could be
dealt with nationally or required diversified treatment. 14 Such a
formula, restated only recently by Chief Justice Stone, 5 is consistent
with the position assumed by the judicial branch in the government:
ever subjects of the power are in their nature national, or admit only
of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be
of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."
12 Lelsy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128 (1890),
holding unconstitutional a state prohibition law when applied to liquor
imported in interstate commerce. Southern Pacific Co. V. State of Ari-
zona, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1469 (1945), holding uncon-
stitutional a state law limiting the length of freight and passenger trains
as applied to movement of trains in Interstate commerce.
13 Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed.
996 (1851), upholding conviction for violation of state law regulating
use and compensation of pilots to enter Port of Philadelphia. "The nature
of the subject when examined, is such as to leave no doubt of the superior
fitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity, of different
systems of regulation, drawn from local knowledge and experience, and
conformed to local wants." Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 63 S. Ct.
307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (4943), upholding a state proration law controlling
production of raisins, 95% of which were sold In interstate commerce,
because (per Stone, C. J.) "the matter is one which may appropriately
be regulated In the interest of the safety, health and well-being of local
communities, and which, because of its local character and the prac-
tical difficulties involved, may never be adequately dealt with by Con-
gress." "The states may regulate matters which, because of their number
and diversity, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress." Stone,
C. J., in Southern Pacific Co. v. State of Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325
U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1469 (1945). See also State of Cali-
fornia v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930, 85 L. Ed. 1219 (1941).
14 "For a hundred years it has been accepted Constitutional doctrine
that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation,
thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the
national commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress has not
acted, this clause the final arbiter between the competing demands of
state and national interests.' Stone, C. J., in Southern Pacific Co. v,
State of Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed.
1469 (1945). See also California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 61 S. Ct.
930, 85 L. Ed. 1219 (1941).
i5 See note 13 suspra. For an appraisal of the work of Stone in restating
the law in this field, see Dowling, op. cit. note 3, supra.
AlAtI LA4 QUART'ERLY
it determines only questions of power and limitations thereon by con-
struction of organic law. It is not concerned with the wisdom or
appropriateness of legislation.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, in which the Chief
Justice concurred, seems to be based on an appreciation of the fore-
going principles. If it is established, as he believed it was, in the cases
relied upon by appellant, 16 that the racial problam as it relates to
interstate commerce may appropriately be handled uniformly by the
federal government, failure of Congress to act does not expose inter-
state commerce to the burden of local rules, no matter what policy
the state seeks to advance. "The sphere of a state's power has not been
thought to expand or contract because of the policy pmbodied in a
particular regulation." The inference may therefore be drawn, if
there is a real conflict between the prevailing and dissenting opinions,
that the rule of Cooley v. Board of Wardens 17 is no longer followed.
The majority of the court took the view that the limitation of the
commerce clause cannot be invoked unless there is hostility, actual
or threatened, between the state and federal rules. It foUnd no incon-
sistency present, and the possibility of future conflict remote, inasmuch
as federal law in related fields and the Canadian law were actually
similar.ls Certainly this is a refusal to treat the problem as one of
defining the automatic limitations of the federal constitution, and the
substitution of a test of actual or potential conflict. The holding of
the majority is tempered, however, by an attempt to distinguish the
cases on which appellant relied19 by saying that those cases were actually
cases of transportation in interstate commerce, while the court could
not conceive, in the field of foreign commerce, "a segment so completely
and locally isolated . . . so peculiarly and almost exclusively affecting
. . . people and institutions" of a single state. Is this the equivalent
of saying that excursion trips to foreign countries or other states, which
terminate in an immediate return to the place of departure, present
local problems which can never be regulated adequately by Congress?
16 Hail v. de Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878), and Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 66 S. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317, 165 A.L.R. 547
(1946).
17 See notes 11, 13, supra.
1I "The province of Ontario enacted in 1944 its Racial Discrimination
Act, Session Laws 1944, c. 51. Federal legislation has Indicated a national
policy against racial discrimination in the requirement, not urged here
to be specifically applicable in this case, of the Interstate Commerce
Act that carries subject to its provisions provide equal facilities for all
passengers, 49 U.S.C. I 3 (1) . .. extended to carriers by water and air,
46 U.S.C. § 815, 49 U.S.C. §4 484, 905 ... Federal legislation also compels
a collective bargaining agent to represent all employees in the bargaining
unit without discrimination because of race. 45 U.S.C. 1 151 et seq."
Marginal note 16, by the court in the principal case.
19 See note 16, mtpra.
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An affirmative answer would seem to be so indicated, by the fact that
two justices20 concurred specially, holding that conflict,2' actual or
potential, is the sole test. At least, the prevailing opinion is not wholly
inconsistent with the views expressed in the dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Jackson.
No one of these three opinions denies that there was regulation of
foreign commerce. An appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment having
been abandoned,22 the court did not consider whether the carrier
would be compelled to accept custom which, regarding the peculiar
nature of its business and the current depravity of the Middle West,2 3
would drive away desirable clientele and depreciate the property devoted
to public use without compensation. Subsequent cases24 have proved
that this would be useless: proprietary interests will not be protected
when the civil rights of others are incidentally offended. One suspects
that the majority was determined to give encouragement to legislative
experiments in this field, and loath to permit the mere technicalities of
the law to block progress. In that respect, the case offers an inter-
esting contrast to precedents, 25 in which the commerce clause was held
to prevent state experiments in the prohibition of intemperance and-
the repeal of the law of supply and demand, respectively. Absent a
question of civil rights, the court may be disposed to return again
to Cooley v. Board of Wardens.:
20 Douglas, Black, JJ.
21 "This regulation would not place a burden on interstate commerce
within the meaning of our cases. It does not impose a regulation which
discriminates against interstate commerce, or which, by specifying the
mode In which it shall be conducted, disturbs the uniformity essential
to its proper functioning." The court cited Missouri Pacific Co. v. Larabee
Flour Mills Co., 211 14. S. 612, 29 S. Ct. 214, 53 L. Ed. 352 (1908),
holding that a state may impose a duty to exchange cars carrying Inter-
state freight .to expedite service; but see, contra, St. Louis S.W.R. CO. v.
Arkansas, 217 U. S. 136, 30 S. Ct. 476, 54 L. Ed. 698, 29 L.R.A: (N. S.)
802 (1909). Earlier cases are probably no longer controlling because
the court no longer takes the view that the "reserved powers" of the
federal government. Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56
S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477. 102 A.L.R. 914 (1936), with United States v.
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
22 See marginal note 12 to the opinion in the principal case.
23 It ts now presumed that a confession obtained from a colored youth
by police officers in Canton, Ohio, after midnight, is unlawfully extorted.
Haley v. State of Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 68 S. Ct. 302 (1947).
24 Restrictive covenants respecting use of land based upon race or
color, are not illegal, but may not be enforced in state courts. Shelle v.
Kraemer, 68 S. Ct. 836 (U. S. 1948).
25 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128 (1890);
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1082, 101 A.L.R.
55 (1935).
'26 Note 11, pra.
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The case may also be important in that it places foreign commerce
on a par with interstate commerce with respect to the state's power
of regulations. If there has been some doubt27 whether that be true,
it has scarcely been dissipated by a case involving a mere segment of
foreign commerce, peculiarly and exclusively affecting the people of a
single state.
27 Possibly because of the fact, noted by Cardozo, J., in Baldwin v.
Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032, 101 A.L.R. 55 (1935),
that foreign commerce is protected by specific prohibitions on imports
and duties, while interstate commerce is protected only by the impli-
cations of the commerce clause, it has been felt that all limitations
with respect to foreign commerce must be express; possibly also because
of the fact that foreign commerce and incidental matters are often
regulated by treaty.
